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The history of the technical warranty in insurance law is in-
structive in showing how a rule, never very good or necessary,
may, like more human creatures, so degenerate through later asso-
ciations and changed conditions as to become positively bad, and
so injurious to society that it must needs be brought to an end
by legal process. In the United States, the reign of the technical
warranty is almost over. For over a century it has been con-
demned by courts and text writers as an instrument of oppression
and unfair dealing, and this sentence of condemnation is n6w
being rapidly executed in the several states by the enactment of
statutes wholly abolishing it as a rule of law. Even in those
states, now relatively few, in which it has not been specifically
abolished by statute, the warranty has been deserted even by its
only friends, the underwriters. It is seldom that one now finds
a trace of the warranty in the policies of reputable life insurance
companies; and in the standard fire policy, now almost universally
in use, warranties have been confined to a small and relatively un-
objectionable field.
These statutes generally provide, with more or less of precision
and success, that warranties shall be construed as representations,
and that no misrepresentations unless material or fraudulent shall
prevent recovery on an insurance policy.' The prevalence of these
'For examples of these statutes see Rev. Laws, Mass., i9o2, Ch. zi8,
Sec. 21; Comp. Laws, Mich., i8q7, Sec. 5T8o; Ky. St. (Barbour v. Carroll),
Ch. 32, Sec. 639.
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statutes justifies the conclusion that in the opinion of the legal pro-
fession the warranty in insurance law is now a mistake, and that
it should be transformed into the representation. This very obvi-
ous conclusion suggests the inquiry: Was the warranty ever any-
thing but a mistake? And should it not always have been re-
garded by the courts, as legislatures have now ordered that it
must be regarded, as a representation? There can be no question
that the warranty, as fully developed in our common law decisions,
is an anomaly in contract law. The legal effect of the warranty
is thus well stated by Bronson, J.
2 : "A warranty by the assured
in relation to the existence of a particular fact must be strictly
true, or the policy will not take effect; and this is so whether
the thing warranted be material to the risk or not. It would, per-
haps, be more proper to say, that the parties have agreed on the
materiality of the thing warranted, and that the agreement pre-
cludes all inquiry on the subject." Its peculiarity consists in that
any error in a warranted statement is fatal to the contract, even
though the statement be immaterial or even trivial in nature, and
the error due to an honest and even unavoidable mistake. Thus,
if the insured in perfect good faith warrants that his three
brothers are all alive, whereas one has been recently drowned at
sea without knowledge on the part of the insured, the mis-
statement will absolutely avoid a policy containing such warranty.
3
The error thus made worked absolutely no injury to the'insurer,
and was due to no fraud or wrong on the part of the insured;
yet under this remarkable rule of law the insurer may deny all
liability under his contract, although good sense, fair dealing and
common justice would require it to be enforced. So where the
insured warrants that his father died of pleurisy, whereas in fact
he is proved to have died of pneumonia, the mistake innocently
made by the insured in such a case is absolutely harmless to the
insurer, and yet the insurer need not perform his contract.
4 But
if, in either case, the court can discover that the statement is a
representation, and not a warranty, the rights of the insured under
the policy will be saved, as in good conscience they ought to be.
5
It is needless to attempt to justify such a grotesque result as the
2 In Burritt v. Insurance Co., 5 Hill (N. Y.), 193, 40 Am. Dec., 345.
'Compare Globe Mutual Life Insurance Ass'n v. Wagner, 188 Ill., 133.
4 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Rutherford, 98 Va., 195; Hoeland v.
Western Union Life Ins. Co. (Wash., igo), lO7 Pac., 866.
5 Moulor v. Ins. Co., 11i U. S., 335; Globe Mutual Life Ins. Ass'n v.
lVagner, 188 Ill., 133.
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forfeiture of valuable contract rights upon the trifling turn of a
technical phrase by saying that if the insured was foolish enough
to make his contract wholly dependent upon the literal truth of
the statements warranted, he has no right to complain. In fact,
in neither case did the insured have the slightest suspicion that
when he signed the paper containing the long list of questions
and answers he was staking all his rights under the contract upon
the absolute accuracy of the statement in question.
The reports are full of cases involving other branches of mer-
cafitile law in which the strict performance of material conditions
precedent has been required ;' but one may search in vain among
these cases for a single instance in which an innocent party has
lost all rights under his contract because of the non-performance
of any condition wholly immaterial.7 Neither can one find in other
systems of law any such harsh rule of forfeiture as is possible
under the common law warranty in insurance contracts. It is
quite true that continental authorities show that material condi-
tions.determining the character of the risk assumed by the under-
writer are strictly enforced,8 but there is to be found no suggestion
that the breach of immaterial conditions should prove fatal to the
contract."
The considerations just stated lead us to inquire why this
peculiar and inequitable rule was ever established, and whether
its establishment ever served a useful or necessary purpose. At
the threshold of the inquiry into the origin and development of
this rule, which is admitted to be peculiar to insurance law, it is
necessary first to consider in what respect the contract of insur-
ance is itself peculiar. This, in turn, requires us to note the cir-
cumstances under which the underwriter's contract was made
during the eighteenth century, when the law of insurance was
taking form tinder the powerful though somewhat arbitrary hand
of Lord Mansfield. At that time underwriters were accustomed
to congregate at Lloyd's Coffee House, in London. Thither a
6 See Smith v. Dart, I4 Q. B. D., io5; Austin s,. Friars, 71 L. T., 27;
Morgan v. Brine. 9 Bing., 672; Norrington s,. Wright, 115 U. S., x88.
Compare Oberlies v. Bullinger, 132 N. Y., 598.; Nolan -,. W17hitney,
88 N. Y., 648; Phillip v. Gallant, 62 N. Y., 256; Singcr Mfg. Co. v. McLean,
lO5 Ala., 316, x6 So., 912.
8 See Emerigon, Traitj des Assurances, pp. 164, 171; Roccus, Not. 38;
i Phillips, Ins., p. 421.
0 See Goirand, French Commercial Law, pp. 331, 332; Schuster, Prin-
ciples of German Civil Law, p. 314.
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person desiring insurance brought a paper containing 
proposals
for insurance upon some risk, usually marine in character, 
which
was described on the paper. This paper or policy was then 
sub-
mitted to brokers successively, who underwrote it in such amounts
as they thought fit. It might be possible that the applicant 
for
insurance would, upon inquiry, supplement the written 
descrip-
tion of the risk by further parol statements. By virtue 
of a
usage that very naturally grew up among these underwriters 
con-
tracting under such circumstances there were several conditions
imposed by implication upon every contract of marine insurance.
The most important of these were: (i) that a vessel insured
should be sea-worthy at the beginning of the voyage; (2) 
that
the voyage described in the policy should be pursued directly 
with-
out deviation; (3) that the insured had communicated to the 
un-
derwriter all facts pertaining to the risk assumed which 
were
material thereto, provided they were known to the insured or
ought to have been known to him in due course of business 
;1o
(4) that all material representations made by the insured 
respect-
ing the risk should be substantially correct, without reference 
to
the question of fraudulent intent. All of these implied conditions
arose out of the necessity that in so highly speculative a contract
the risk proposed must be accurately defined, and the further
necessity that the underwriter should look wholly to the insured
for the information defining the risk. In estimating the character
of the risk assumed, therefore, the underwriter relied as much
upon these implied conditions as upon those expressly written in
the policy and termed warranties. Indeed, the first two implied
conditions mentioned are customarily termed the implied war-
ranties of sea-worthiness and against deviation.
These usages connected with assurances were manifestly rea-
sonable enough, and the implied conditions arising from them
appear with equal clearness to be both convenient and proper.
Let us now see how they fared in the courts of common law.
The term "warranted" was evidently in customary use in the
seventeenth century, but in the few insurance cases reported as
being tried in the common law courts prior to Lord Mansfield's
accession as Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, in 1756,
there is nothing to indicate that the term had any other signifi-
cance than to introduce a condition that had to be strictly per-
lOProudfoot v. Montefiore, L. R., 2 Q. B., 5II.
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formed. 1  The first case coming before Lord Mansfield, Woolme
v. Muihnan,1 2 involving a fraudulently false warranty of neu-
trality, presented no difficulty. It was easily determined that the
contract was unenforceable. But the next important case proved
more difficult.1 3 The underwriter had relied upon written instruc-
tions, shown to him by the broker of the insured, in which the
vessel insured was described as mounting tvelve guns and twenty
men. As a matter of fact she mounted only ten carriage guns
and nine swivels, with sixteen men and eleven boys. It was
testified that the force actually shipped was stronger than that
mentioned in the instructions upon which the underwriter relied.
Nevertheless, the statement was not literally true, and it became
necessary for Lord Mansfield to determine whether the substantial
truth of such a statement was sufficient to uphold the contract.
This he did in the following sweeping language: "There is no
distinction better known to those who are at all conversant in
the law of insurance than that which exists between a warranty
or condition which makes part of a written policy, and a repre-
sentation of the state of the case. Where it is a part of the writ-
ten policy, it must be performed; as if there be a warranty of
convoy, there it must be a convoy; nothing tantamount will do or
answer the purpose; it must be strictly performed, as being part
of the agreement; for there it might be said the party would not
have insured without convoy. But as, by the law of merchants,
all dealings must be fair and honest, fraud infects and vitiates
every mercantile contract. Therefore, if there is fraud in a repre-
sentation, it will avoid the policy, as a fraud, but not as a part
of the agreement. So there cannot be a clearer distinction than
that which exists between a warranty which makes part of the
written policy, and a collateral representation, which, if false in a
point of materiality, makes the policy void; but if not material,
it can hardly ever be fraudulent." The underwriters were, there-
fore, held liable since the statement was substantially true and the
risk in no wise greater than that which they had assumed. The
distinction thus sharply made by Lord Mansfield between de-
scriptive statements of the risk written in the policy and those not
so included, evidently came as a surprise to the underwriters,
11 See Jeffries v. Legendra (891), 4 Mod., 58; Carthew, 216 (S. C.,
3 Lev., 32o); Lethulier's Case (1692), 2 Salk., 443; Gordon v. Morley
(1747), 2 Str., 1419.
12 (1763) 1 W. Bl., 427; 3 Burr., 1419.
13'Pawson v. Watson (1778), 2 Cowper, 785.
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for we find the following note attached to Cowper's report of the
case: "4 "N. B.-On the Monday following, Mr. Davenport said
he was desired by the underwriters to ask whether it was the
opinion of the court that to make written instructions valid 
and
binding as a warranty, they must be inserted in the policy? 
Lord
Mansfield answered that most undoubtedly that was the opinion
of the court. If a man warrants that a ship shall depart 
with
twelve guns, and it departs with ten only, it is contrary 
to the
condition of the policy."
The underwriters evidently regarded all descriptive statements,
relied upon in assuming the risk, whether written in the 
policy or
elsewhere, or only implied from usage, as upon the same 
footing.
They doubtless would have been quite as willing to take 
advan-
tage of unjust forfeitures upon immaterial misrepresentations 
as
upon immaterial breaches of warranty. In like manner 
it would
have been quite possible for the court, without doing any 
violence
to law or logic, to give to recitals of fact within the policy 
the
same legal effect that was so justly given to recitals of 
fact writ-
ten on a separate paper. It is true, however, that the 
court still
looked upon the truth or untruth of the representation 
as involv-
ing a question of fraud, rather than an implied condition 
of the
contract.
In MacDowell v. Fraser,
1"1 decided in the following year Lord
Mansfield refers to the distinction between a warranty and 
a rep-
resentation as being perfectly well settled. "A representation
must be fair and true. It should be true as to all that the insured
knows; and, if he represents facts to the underwriter without
knowing the truth, he takes the risk upon himself. But the dif-
ference between the fact as it turns out, and as represented, 
must
be material." But while the distinction between warranties and
representations was regarded at this time as being perfectly 
well
settled, it had not yet been finally determined that an immaterial
breach of warranty would avoid a policy, since all the. cases that
had arisen bad involved breaches unmistakably material. In-
deed, in Bean v. Stupart,"
6 decided in.1778, Lord Mansfield gave
some hopeful indications of an intention to keep the warranty
within the bounds of reason. In that case, the insured had war-
a 2 Cowper, 790.
.(1779) I Doug., 26o.
10 (1778) i Doug., ii. See also Hyde v. Bruce (783) ; 3 Doug., 213,
Marshall, Ins., 249.
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ranted that the vessel insured was manned by thirty seamen,
whereas in fact, only twenty-six persons had signed the ship's
articles, and among these were reckoned the steward, the cook,
the surgeon, and some boys. The warranted number of thirty
could be made up only by including some apprentices, not articled.
Nevertheless, the court left it to the jury to say whether the
parties meant to include within the term "seamen," all members
of the crew, as distinguished from some passengers who were
aboard. But any hope that the prenicious growth of the war-
ranty would be checked was quickly disappointed by the decision
of Kenyon v. Berthon."7 In that case insurance upon a vessel de-
scribed in the policy as "in port 2oth of July, 1776," was held to
be defeated on proof of the fact that she had sailed two days
earlier. As a matter of fact the time of the sailing of vessels has
always been regarded by underwriters as material to the risk, but
Lord Mansfield in deciding this case declared that "though the
difference of two days may not make any material difference in
the risk, yet as the condition has not been complied with, the un-
derwriter is not liable." But it is not until 1786 that we find the
fully developed warranty really in action. In De Hahn v. Hart-
ley,i s a vessel was insured for a voyage from Africa to the West
Indies. The vessel was described as "warranted copper sheathed,
and sailed from Liverpool with fourteen six-pounders, * * * *
fifty hands or upwards." The vessel having been captured during
the period covered by the policy, the underwriter paid the loss.
Subsequently, learning that the vessel had sailed from Liverpool
with only forty-six hands, although it had, six hours later, taken
on six additional men at Anglesea, thus sailing from that island
with fifty-two men, the broker brought his action to recover the
money paid on the ground that the insurance was void for breach
of warranty. It is very clear that the risk assumed for the
voyage from Africa to the West Indies was in no wise enhanced
by the fact that the vessel had only forty-six hands during the
short voyage on inland waters from Liverpool to Anglesea, yet
it was held that the policy was avoided by the breach of the
warranty. In his opinion, Lord Mansfield stated the law in this
characteristic fashion: "There is a material distinction between
a warranty and a representation. A representation may be equita-
1T (1779) Park Ins. (6th ed.), 426 (S. C., i Doug., 12, n.).
28 1 T. R., 343. Phillips gently and sadly disapproves this case. See
T Phillips' Ins. (5th ed.), 419.
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bly and substantially answered; but a warranty must be strictly
complied with. Supposing a warranty to sail on the first of
August, and the ship did not sail till the second, the warranty
would not be complied with.. A warranty in a policy of insurance
is a condition or a contingency, and unless that be performed,
there is no contract. It is perfectly immaterial for what purpose a
warranty is introduced; but being inserted, the contract does not
exist unless it be literally complied with. Now, in the present case,
the condition was the sailing of the ship with a certain number of
men; which not being complied with, the policy is void."
Since the court had decided that the distinction between war-
ranties and representations was accompanied by such striking and
surprising legal consequences, it naturally was a matter of great
interest to the underwriters to know when a statement descriptive
of a risk was a warranty and when a representation. Lord
Mansfield very quickly decided that a statement written in the
policy was a warranty, while one written anywhere else, or not
written at all, was only a representation.
9 Then the question
arose, How must it be written in the policy? It was determined
that a statement should bear the magical potency of the warranty
if it was written anywhere on the face of the policy as on the
margin, straight or obliquely ;2 but if the written statement was
inscribed on a different paper folded within the policy,
21 or even
fastened by a wafer to the policy
-2 it was no more than a repre-
sentation, which could not destroy the rights of the insured or
enable the underwriter to escape his liability, unless. it had really
prejudiced the underwriter. It will be observed that the mere fact
that a stipulation or a descriptive term was written in the policy
was of itself sufficient to determine its character as a warranty.
No other evidence of the intention of the parties to make it a
warranty was deemed necessary.
In order to appreciate fully the significance of this distinction,
as worked out by Lord Mansfield, between warranties and repre-
sentations, it will be necessary for us to consider briefly the de-
velopment of the theory upon which the rules of law as to con-
cealment and representations were based. There can be little
l"Pawson v. Watson (1778), 2 Cowp., 785. The rule was regarded
as settied in Lothian v. Henderson (H. L., 1803), 3 Bos. & Pull, 499.
20Bean v. Stupart (778), 1 Doug., ixi; Kenyon v. Berthon (779),
Park Ins. (6th ed.), 426, E. C. Doug., 12 n.
2 Pawson v. Fletcher (1779), i Doug., 12 n.
22 Bice v. Fletcher (x779), 1 Doug., 284, Park Ins. (6th ed.), 425.
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question but that in the earlier cases, the rules with reference both
.to concealments and representations were regarded as grounded
upon fraud.2 3 Sir James Allan Park, whose interesting treatise on
insurance was first published in x786, while Lord Mansfield was
still on the bench, treats all concealments and representations
under the chapter heading, "Frauds in Policies." Marshall, writ-
ing in 1802, also regards concealments and representations as
kinds of fraud. But it early became apparent that a misdescrip-
tion of the risk to be assumed, though due to the honest mistake
of the insured, might prove as injurious to the underwriter who
relied on it as if it had been fraudulently false. That Lord Mans-
field fully appreciated this fact appears from this statement found
in his opinion in Fillis v. Brutton :2- "In all insurances it is essen-
tial to the contract that the assured should represent the true state
of the ship to the best of his knowledge. On that information the
underwriters engage. If he states that as a fact which he does not
know to be true, but only believes it, it is the same as a warranty.
He is bound to tell the underwriters truth." So in Fitz-herbert v.
Mather,2 where material information possessed by the agent of
the insured, but not communicated by such agent was not dis-
closed to the underwriter because actually unknown to the in-
sured, Lord Mansfield said: "Now, whether this happened by
fraud or negligence, it makes no difference; for in either case
the policy is void."
The practical result reached by the courts before Mansfield re-
tired from the bench may be stated thus: The description of the
risk upon which the underwriter relied in determining whether
he would assume the risk or not, or at what premium he would
assume it, might be found within the policy or without it. So far
as the descriptive terms chanced to be within the policy, they
must be literally true, irrespective of their materiality, but if they
chanced to be without the policy the insurance remained valid
unless the misdescription was of such character as really to injure
the underwriter; that is, unless the misdescription was sub-
stantial .and material. This rule so inherently unreasonable and
so highly dangerous in its technicality, cannot be justified on the
ground that it accorded with the usages of merchants. Even the
23See Pawson v. Watson (778), 2 Cowp., 785; Bize v. Fletcher
(1779), 1 Doug.. 284.
24 (782) Park Ins. (6th ed.), 250.
2.5 (1785) I T. R., 12.
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meagre reports of the time contain sufficient information to show
that merchants and brokers were not infrequently surprised by
Mansfield's decisions, and that they were sometimes ordered in a
very summary fashion to change their customary way of doing
business in order to comply with the law as Mansfield declared
it.26
It is well here to note the distinction that exists between affirma-
tive warranties which are stipulations that certain facts exist, and
promissory warranties which are merely executory terms of the
contract agreed to be material. The rule requiring promissory
warranties to be strictly performed has not in practice worked
out differently from the general rule that requires strict perfor-
mance of all material terms in other kinds of mercantile contracts,
for it is difficult to find any instance of an immaterial promissory
warranty. The very fact that the parties have expressly stipulated
for the future performance of any act is in effect conclusive evi-
dence that they regarded the performance of that act as material.
It is with reference to such promissory warranties that Sir James
Allan Park writes,2 7 "To say that the underwriter should answer
for a loss, notwithstanding the other party has failed in his en-
gagements, would be to make a different rule in this species of
contract, from that which subsists in every other; although this
of all other contracts depends most upon the strictest attention
to the purest rules of equity and good faith." Promissory insur-
ance warranties have frequently been classed with the ordinary
conditions precedent in mercantile contracts. Thus in Norrington
v. Wright,28 Mr. Justice Gray had in mind such warranties when
he said, "A statement descriptive of the subject-matter, or of some
material incident, such as the time or place of shipment, is ordi-
narily to be regarded as a warranty, in the sense in which that
term is used in insurance and maritime law, that is to say, a
condition precedent, upon the failure or nonperformance of
which the party aggrieved may repudiate the whole contract." As
to the promissory warranty there is no ground for serious
objection.
But the affirmative warranty is of quite different nature. It is
a recital of fact. It merely seres to describe and define the risk
that is assumed by the underwriter. The underwriter is entitled
26 See Pawson z,. Watson (x778), Cowp., 785.
27 Park Ins. (6th ed.), 422.
28 115 U. S., 188.
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to a strictly accurate description of the risk that is assumed.
He has every reason to complain if he is led, either by the
failure of the insured to disclose all material facts bear-
ing on the risk, or by his misrepresentations of such facts, to
assume a risk different from that which he had intended to as-
sume. But it really makes no difference to the broker whether the
statements descriptive of the risk are written within the policy
or without it, or whether they are labeled "warranties" or not, or
whether they are express or implied warranties. If the risk dif-
fers materially from the one he has assumed he should not be
expected to pay, whatever the misleading descriptive terms may
be called. But, if the risk as described and assumed, does not
differ in any material respect from the risk as it actually exists,
there is no reason why the underwriter should not pay, even
though the shibboleth "warranty" be found in the policy.
In early times, fire insurance policies and even life policies
were made under circumstances not materially different from
those existing in the case of marine insurance. The property in-
sured was frequently in some distant and inaccessible place and
therefore not susceptible of examination by the uiiderwriter.2
9
He was compelled to rely as completely upon the information af-
forded by the insured as in the case of marine risks. Hence, we
are not surprised to find that in England the rule of law that had
been developed in connection with marine insurance was applied
in its full extent to insurances on property on land, and on life.30
In the United States, however, the courts early came to an ap-
preciation of the essential difference between the conditions that
had given rise to the rules of law governing marine insurance and
those that attended the making of a contract of fire or life in-
surance.3 1 The subjects of the latter kinds of insurance are ac-
cessible to the insurer for examination, which will usually enable
him, with his expert knowledge, to form a far better estimate of
the character of the risk than the insured himself. Since the in-
surer was no longer compelled to rely wholly upon the insured for
information, it was no longer necessary to impose upon the in-
29For examples, see Carter v. Boehn (1766), 3 Burr, i9o5; Bufe v.
Turner (1815), 6 Taunton, 338; Stackpole v. Simon (1779), Park Ins. (6th
ed.), 582; Lindenau v. Desborough (I828), 8 B. & C., 586.
30 Bufe v. Turner, 6 Taunt., 338; Huguenin v. Rayley, 6 Taunt., 186;
Morrison v. Muspratt. 4 Bing.. 6o; Lindenat v. Dcsborough, 8 B. & C.. 586.
31 See the excellent opinion of Ranney. J., in Hartford Protection
Ins. Co. v. Ilariner, 2 Ohio St., 452, 59 Am. Dec.. 684.
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sured so heavy a duty of disclosure. Hence, the American courts
have very generally relaxed the rules of marine insurance to the
extent of relieving the insured from the obligation of disclosing
any facts concerning fire and life risks, save such as, in the exer-
cise of good faith, he knows will enhance the risk, and such as
are made the subject of inquiry by the insurer.32 But the harsh
rule of the warranty was allowed to continue in all its rigour,
although scarcely a vestige of the doubtful reason which had ex-
cused its establishment in marine insurance could apply to insur-
ances on life and property on land. The result might well have
been anticipated. Policies become overgrown with a wilderness
of warranties, many of the most trivial character, in
which the rights of the policy holder, however honest and
careful, were in grave danger of being lost. It was neces-
sary for the courts to go to the rescue of the public. It was too
late to do what Lord Mansfield should have done; that is, declare
that an immaterial warranty should have no more effect upon
the rights of the insured than an immaterial 'representation; but
they did hold that no stipulation, though written in the policy,
should be construed as a warranty, unless it was clearly and un-
nistakably so intended by the parties, as indicated by the un-
equivocal language of the policy. 3 The unseemly struggle that
ensued between the unwise insurers who sought so to frame their
policies as to compel the courts to allow them the dishonest benefit
of forfeitures unsuspected by the insured, and the courts who
sought by liberal construction, and sometimes distortion of the
language of the policies, to do justice in spite of the warranties,
resulted in a mass of litigation and confused precedent, the like of
which cannot be found in any other field of our law. It is a
cause for gratification that the total abolition of the warranty,
which never had good reason for existence and now has none at
all, will tend to enable the courts to apply to insurance policies
the same rules of construction that determine the meaning of
other contracts.
New Haven, Conn. William R. Vance.
32 See the opinion of Taft, J., in Penn inftt. Life Ins. Co. v. Trust Co.,
72 Fed., 413. which contains the best discussion of the subject to be found
in the books. Also see Vance, Ins., 253.
13 For examples of such liberal construction see Monlor -,. Insurance
CO., its U. S., 335; Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Raddin. 120 U. S., 183;
Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Johnston, So Ala.. 467; Globe Mut. Life
Ins. Ass'n v. Wagner, 188 Ill., 133.
